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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
as to be unconscionable or fraudulent, 8 and such was not the situation here.
In holding that mere inadequacy of consideration is in itself a bar to
specific performance the court relied on Walker v. Bohannan.9 a Missouri
case, in which the court said that in order that specific performance be
decreed by equity "the contract must be based upon an adequate and legal
consideration, so that its performance upon the one hand, but not upon the
other, would bespeak an unconscionable advantage and wrong, demanding
in good conscience relief in equity. . ." This statement was not necessary
to the decision in the Walker case, and it is quite possible that what the
court meant was simply that the consideration must be sufficient to support
a promise, a requirement basic in contract law. Such seems to be the
proper interpretation of the term "adequate and legal consideration," used
in the Walker case.
J. C. L. '36.
EVIDENCE-WITNESSES-CHARACTER-IMPEACHMENT.-The credibility of
a witness may universally be impeached by showing that his character for
truth and veracity is bad, and in some jurisdictions inquiries relative to the
general moral character of the witness are permissible as a proper mode
of impeachment.' The courts in these latter jurisdictions faced something
of a dilemma when statutes removing the common law disqualifications al-
lowed the accused in a criminal prosecution to take the stand in his own
8 Bean v. Valle, (1829) 2 Mo. 126; Kirkpatrick v. Wiley (1906) 197 Mo.
123, 95 S. W. 213; Evans v. Evans (1906) 196 Mo. 1, 93 S. W. 969; Holmes
v. Fresh (1845) 9 Mo. 201; Scott v. Habinck (1919) 188 Ia. 155, 174 N.
W. 1. In regard to the whole problem see "Missouri Law on Performance of
Oral Contracts as a Method of Validation when Statute of Frauds Is In-
voked," by Professor Tyrrell Williams in 20 St. Louis Law Rev. 106 (1935).
9 (1912) 243 Mo. 119, 147 S. W. 1024. In this case the following require-
ments were set out: "(1) the alleged oral contract must be clear, explicit,
and definite; (2) it must be proven as pleaded; (3) such contract cannot
be established by conversations either too ancient on the one hand, or too
loose or casual upon the other; (4) the alleged oral contract must itself be
fair and not unconscionable; (5) the proof of the contract as pleaded must
be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind of the chancellor that
the contract as alleged was in fact made, and that the full performance, so
far as lies in the hands of the parties to perform, has been had; (6) and
the work constituting performance must be such as is referable solely to
the contract sought to be enforced and not such as might be reasonably
referable to some other and different contract; (7) the contract must be
based upon an adequate and legal consideration, so that its performance
upon the one hand, but not upon the other, would bespeak an unconscion-
able advantage and wrong, demanding in good conscience relief in equity;(8) proof of mere disposition to devise by will or convey by deed by way
of gift, or as a reward for services, is not sufficient, but there must be
shown a real contract to devise by will or convey by deed made before the
acts of performance relied upon were had." In this case specific perfor-
mance was denied because the contract was not sufficiently established.
'2 Wigmore, Evidence, secs. 922-923; 28 R. C. L. 622; State vs. Scott
(1933) 332 Mo. 255, 58 S. W. (2d) 275, 90 A. L. R. 860; See also annota-
tion 90 A. L. R. 870.
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behalf, thus presenting him in a dual capacity, that of an accused and that
of a witness. 2 As the accused his general moral character was not open to
attack, unless he first put it in issue, if the objective was to use it as proof
of guilt or innocence, but as a witness the defendant was subject to im-
peachment precisely as any other witness.3 No particular problem arose
when the accused took the stand in those courts where impeachment in-
quiries were limited to the witness's character for truth and veracity. The
dilemma presented itself in those tribunals where evidence of general moral
character was proper for impeachment purposes, but improper to prejudice
or affect the defendant as a defendant, and yet it was inevitable that the
evidence would do both. Missouri courts recognized the difficulty but con-
sistently held that incidental prejudice to the accused through admission of
evidence of bad moral character would not preclude its proper admission
for impeachment purposes. 4
In the recent case of State v. Williams, ! a negro woman, for shooting and
killing her paramour, was convicted of murder in the second degree. After
she had left the witness stand, the state was permitted to show in rebuttal
by six witnesses that her general reputation for morality in the community
prior to the homicide was bad. Objection was made to its introduction on
the ground that the defendant had not put her character in issue. The Su-
preme Court after reviewing the Missouri cases, all following the "morality"
rule, beginning with State v. Shieldsc decided in 1850 as to ordinary wit-
nesses, and State v. Clinton 7 decided in 1878 as to a defendant-witness, and
after examining the reasons and principles underlying the two rules, held
that the trial court had committed error in admitting testimony as to gen-
eral character for morality for impeachment purposes, thereby specifically
overruling the controlling doctrine in more than thirty previous cases and
aligning Missouri with the weight of authority which adopts the "truth
and veracity" rule.8
In view of the Missouri statute9 it apparently follows that the decision
cannot be limited solely to cases in which the accused becomes a witness,
and the court expressly did not so confine its opinion, but extends to the
impeachment of all witnesses.
The decision would not seem to affect the general rule that the inquiry as
to character affecting credibility must relate primarily to the time when
2 2 Wigniore, Evidence, see. 889; R. S. Mo. (1929) 3692.
32 Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 890; 28 R. C. L. 620; R. S. Mo. (1929) 3692
specifically provides that a defendant testifying for himself in a criminal
cause "may be contradicted and impeached as any other witness in the
case."
4 The cases are collected and commented upon in State v. Scott, supra n.
1, and again in State v. Williams (1935 Mo.) 87 S. W. (2d) 175. Restric-
tions were sometimes put upon the rule and it was often criticized.
5 Supra, note 4.
6 13 Mo. 236, 53 Am. Dec. 147.
7 67 Mo. 380, 29 Am. Rep. 506.
8 2 Wigmore, Evidence, see. 923.
9 R. S. Mo. (1929) 3692 providing that accused may be impeached as any
other witness.
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the witness testifies, but that that is largely within discretion of the trial
court;' 0 nor the rule that the inquiry should usually be confined to the wit-
ness's reputation in the locality where he resides." Specific acts of wrong-
doing or misconduct are not proper proof of character for impeaching credi-
bility,12 except as they may be brought out in cross examination.13 The de-
cision in the principal case would logically preclude any evidence as to par-
ticular traits other than that for truth and veracity.14 Conviction of some
crimes is everywhere allowed to be used as affecting credibility. 15
R. S. L. '36.
TORTS-CORPORATIONS-SLANDER.-In the case of Atterbury v. Brink's
Express Co. et al.' recently (Feb. 17, 1936) decided by the Kansas City
Court of Appeals, Missouri, the plaintiff, a messenger of the Brink's Ex-
press Co., brought suit for slander against the Brink's Express Co. and
against the manager of its Kansas City office, one Mick, who uttered the
defamatory statement. The court held that the statement uttered by Mick
would justify finding that the words charged or necessarily imputed that
the plaintiff had committed a crime and thereby constituted slander per se.
The court for all practical purposes affirmed the lower court's decision in
favor of the plaintiff, but reversed and remanded the case because of an
error in the plaintiff's pleadings with which we are not concerned here.
The case raises the important question which apparently was not even
considered by the court of the liability of an employer for the slanderous
words uttered by an employee, a question on which there is a distinct diver-
sity of opinion.
10 2 Wigmore, Evidence, secs. 927-928; 28 R. C. L. 632; 70 C. J. 828;
State v. Scott, supra n. 1; Page v. Payne (1922) 293 Mo. 600, 240 S. W.
156; State v. Parker (1888) 96 Mo. 382, 9 S. W. 728; Wood v. Matthews
(1881) 73 Mo. 477; Baillee v. Hudson (1926) 278 S. W. 1056; Winn v. Mod-
ern Woodmen of America (1909) 138 Mo. App. 701, 119 S. W. 536.
1 28 R. C. L. 631; see also 2 Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 930 and 70 C. J.
831; Ulrich v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. (1920) 281 Mo. 697, 220 S. W. 682;
State v. Parker, supra n. 10; Waddinghom v. Hulett (1887) 92 Mo. 528
5 S. W. 27; Johnson v. Martindale (1926 Mo. App.) 288 S. W. 970.
" 28 R. C. L. 623; 70 C. J. 834; see also 2 Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 924;
State v. Williams (1934) 335 Mo. 234, 71 S. W. (2d) 732 (not the principal
case); State v. Cox (1924 Mo.) 263 S. W. 215; Winn v. Modern Woodmen
of America, supra 11. 10; State v. Sassman (1908) 214 Mo. 695, 114 S. W.
590.
' State v. Williams, supra n. 12; State v. Sherry (1933 Mo.) 64 S. W.
(2d) 238; State v. Nasello (1930) 325 Mo. 442, 30 S. W. (2d) 132.
't Mo. courts have allowed inquiries as to particular traits; State v.
Grant (1883) 79 Mo. 113, 49 Am. Rep. 218; State v. Pollard (1903) 174
Mo. 607, 74 S. W. 969; Winn v. Modern Woodmen of America, supra n. 10;
but have also held such evidence inadmissible, State v. Gant (1931 Mo.)
33 S. W. (2d) 970; State v. Irvin (1929) 324 Mo. 217, 22 S. W. (2d) 772
(particular trait involved in offence alleged).
15 2 Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 926; 28 R. C. L. 624; State v. Hawes (1933
Mo.) 60 S. W. (2d) 684; State v. Harrison (1930) 24 S. W. (2d) 985;
State v. Forsha (1905) 190 Mo. 296, 88 S. W. 746, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 576.
190 S. W. (2d) 807.
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